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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Richard F. Knight*
Attorneys and clients are more often in court at odds with one
another. A reading of the appellate decisions during the last term
reveals a growing trend of litigation by and between attorneys and
their clients. This is evidenced by the growing number of cases in-
volving the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the validity of liens to
protect an attorney's right to a fee and, in some instances, at-
torneys' attempts to intervene in their client's litigation in order to
protect their claimed fees. Actions by clients against their attorneys
for malpractice also appear on the rise. Such actions are a regret-
table but predictable consequence of the changing role and image of
attorneys in our society. With the advent of advertising, price com-
petition, and other commercial practices of the market place, the
relationship between attorney and client has suffered.
In matters of discipline, the supreme court continues to seek
that delicate balance needed to protect the public from the actions
of irresponsible or careless attorneys while, at the same time, not
unduly penalizing or punishing an attorney who has demonstrated
an understanding of his prior wrongdoing and has taken those
measures that convince the court that his future conduct will be con-
sistent with the high standards of his profession.
DISCIPLINE
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude again serves as
a basis for disbarment. This is particularly true in cases directly
connected with the practice of law. In Louisiana State Bar Associa-
tion v. Russell,' the attorney was conspiring with others to obstruct
justice by corruptly influencing a witness to give false testimony.
This, the court said, reflected upon his moral fitness to practice law
and tended to undermine "the American justice system and is par-
ticularly reprehensible in a member of the Bar."' Disbarment was
ordered retroactive to the date of initial suspension. Several new
and interesting questions were raised before the court in Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Edwards.' Discipline was sought by the
* Member, Louisiana State Bar Association.
1. 388 So. 2d 788 (La. 1980).
2. I& at 790.
3. 387 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1980).
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Committee on Professional Responsibility of the bar association based
upon the respondent's alleged misconduct in filing a suit "merely to
harass or maliciously injure another" and for counseling his client in
"conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."' The
supreme court found that the attorney's conduct involved dishonesty,
deceit, misrepresentation, and was prejudicial to the administration
of justice. The respondent moved to dismiss the proceedings conten-
ding that the disciplinary action had prescribed and that the com-
mittee had been guilty of laches. The court observed that it had not
promulgated any rules on prescription applicable to disciplinary pro-
ceedings and rejected the motion. The facts revealed that there had
been a delay of some seven years between the filing of the com-
plaint and the action of the Committee on Professional Responsibility.
The committee responded that this delay was occasioned by the fact
that other proceedings were instituted against the respondent and
that during a great portion of that time the respondent was actually
under suspension from the practice of law. The committee further
contended that it should not be required to proceed against a
suspended attorney for additional violations until he resumes the
practice of law. The court found this contention to be without merit
and found the committee's delay unwarranted. In light of these
facts, the court concluded that further suspension or disbarment
would be inappropriate and, instead, imposed a public reprimand.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Causey,5 the respondent
had taken a cash fee from a client, who was in the custody of the
Department of Corrections, and was to seek a pardon for him. The
court found that no action of any consequence was taken by the at-
torney for a period of eight and one-half months and that he was
guilty of neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.' In this case the
court found that this matter involved inattention and procrastina-
tion rather than corrupt motives or moral turpitude. The court was
quick, however, to point out that their decision in the instant case
does not mean that they condone such behavior or that the court
will not impose harsher sanctions in the future. In the words of the
court, "[pirocrastination and inattention can have effects upon the
client that are just as disastrous as if dishonesty were involved."7
The attorney was suspended for ninety days; however, the court
made an exception to this suspension so that the attorney could
complete the services which he was obligated to perform on behalf
of his incarcerated client.
4. Id. at 1138.
5. 393 So. 2d 88 (La. 1981).
6. Id. at 91.
7. d. at 93.
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Suspension for three and one-half months was imposed against
an attorney who had been convicted in federal court of transferring
checks in interstate commerce with knowledge that the money
represented by the checks had been secured from an interim lending
agency by fraud.' This charge, under federal law, constituted a
felony. Under state law, the charge would have been a misdemeanor.
Facts revealed that the conduct of the attorney did not involve
misuse of his license to practice law. In mitigation, the court further
found that the federal trial judge characterized the circumstantial
evidence of intent as "weak." The attorney received no benefit from
the transfer of funds. No one suffered any loss. The transfer merely
involved the moving of corporate funds from one corporate bank ac-
count to another. The most mitigating circumstance was
respondent's voluntary withdrawal from the practice of law during
the disciplinary proceedings. After considering all of these facts, the
court found a three and one-half month suspension to be the ap-
propriate discipline.
A divided court concluded that a six month suspension from the
practice of law was the appropriate sanction against an attorney
whose conduct constituted "at least gross and wanton negligence
reflecting an absolute disregard of his duty competently and profes-
sionally to handle a legal matter intrusted to him, if not a con-
trivance to cause inconvenience to a client."' The attorney had
rendered a title opinion to a bank, certifying that its mortgage was
a good first mortgage. The court found that at the time the attorney
knew of two other mortgages which primed the bank's mortgage,
but did not disclose this fact nor take any steps to secure their
cancellation. After reviewing the facts, the court found that the
respondent did not act with ill motive or dishonest intent and con-
cluded that a six month suspension from the practice of law would
be appropriate. Justice Blanche dissented, indicating that a repri-
mand would be the appropriate sanction. Justice Dennis dissented
also, being of the opinion that a suspension of six months was too le-
nient.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Miller," the respondent
had been convicted of a crime not directly connected with the prac-
tice of law. The court found that the attorney had properly
rehabilitated himself since the crime and that his conduct subse-
quent to that date had been "without any further discredit to
himself or to his profession."" The court ordered an eighteen month
8. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Levy, 389 So. 2d 51 (La. 1980).
9. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Core, 384 So. 2d 754, 758 (La. 1980).
10. 382 So. 2d 911 (La. 1980).
11, Id. at 912.
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suspension, believing that the respondent was sincerely contrite and
repentent, had made restitution, and had demeaned himself since
the one isolated incident of wrongful conduct.
FEES- CONTRACTS- LIENS
In the matter of Kelly v. National Life and Accident Insurance
Co., 2 the first circuit considered a dispute between a surviving
spouse and a named beneficiary over the proceeds of a life insurance
policy. An attorney intervened in the proceedings on his own behalf,
seeking a portion of the policy proceeds, based on his contention
that his efforts alone were responsible for the discovery of the
policy and that, therefore, he was entitled to receive a portion
thereof under the "fund doctrine." The court held, citing Sizeler v.
Sizeler,3 that life insurance proceeds, unless so designated, form no
part of the estate of the deceased, but inure directly to the named
beneficiary. As to the attorney's contention, the court denied him
any relief. It found that "his talents and efforts were both employed
and deployed to disqualify"'" the named beneficiary under the policy.
Since she prevailed, the court reasoned, the lawyer "may not now be
heard and supported in any assertion that he is entitled to one-third
of the proceeds."'5
In Succession of Marcel" the court recognized the right of at-
torneys to collect under their contingent fee contract, which was
entered into by them with the provisional tutor of minors. The con-
tingent fee contract had been approved by the court at the time of
its confection, which occured two and one-half years prior to settle-
ment of the minors' claims. Shortly prior to the settlement of the
claims, a new tutor was appointed and at her insistence the employ-
ment of the attorneys was terminated. The court found that the
original attorneys were primarily responsible for the minors' re-
covery. Since their contract had been approved by the court, they
were entitled to their contingent fee.
The well established doctrine that a breach of contract does not
generally give rise to an award of attorney's fees unless attorney's
fees are authorized by the contract or by statute was reiterated in
Cobb v. Gallet." In Cobb, the court found that the defendant had
12. 393 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
13. 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
14. 393 So. 2d at 132.
15. Id.
16. 395 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
17. 392 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
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wrongfully terminated the contract of lease and had obtained
possession of his property by "extra legal means." However, the
court did not find this sufficient to constitute fraud or bad faith on
the part of the contracting party against whom relief was sought. 8
In Cheatham v. City of New Orleans,"' the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal was confronted with two applications for certiorari re-
sulting from a conflict among a judgment creditor who had paid
$619,000 in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it, the at-
torneys who collected the judgment, and the attorney who contended
that he was entitled to a portion of the fee pursuant to a contract.
The attorney seeking the fee sought to intervene in the proceeding
after the judgment became final and had been satisfied by the defen-
dant. The attorney claimed an interest in the judgment pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218. The court held the statute inap-
plicable and the intervention improper since there was no "pending
action."'2 The use of summary procedure, the court indicated, was
improper. The parties, to the extent that they had a new cause of
action, were relegated to a new ordinary proceeding.
In O'Bryan v. O'Bryan,2" the court of appeal shed additional light
on the duties of a court-appointed attorney in a divorce suit which is
coupled with incidental matters of custody and child support. After
review of the applicable articles of the Code of Civil Procedure2 and
the comments thereunder, the court concluded that the appointed
attorney is limited to those matters specifically permitted by the
Code. Therefore, it was found that he was "no longer advancing a
defense for his absentee client, but was asserting additional relief on
her behalf"" when he filed a reconventional demand for child sup-
port. This he had no right to do.
Distinguishing its earlier decision on the subject, a divided
supreme court permitted an attorney to enter into a contingency fee
contract to represent a wife in the partition of a community when
the contract was entered into after the separation of the husband
and wife but before divorce."4 In the earlier case of Succession of
Butler,"' which involved a similar contingency fee contract executed
prior to judgment of separation, the court held such a contract to be
18. Id at 135, 136.
19. 391 So. 2d 1324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 1326.
21. 391 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
22. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 5094 & 5095.
23. 391 So. 2d at 1209.
24. Olivier v. Doga, 384 So. 2d 330 (La. 1980).
25. 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974).
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contrary to public policy and reprobated by law, since it could tend
to hinder reconciliation. In the instant case, the supreme court,
reversing the court of appeal, found that reliance on Butler was
misplaced. The court stated that "there is no public-policy against a
wife protecting her share in the community of acquets and gains ...
inasmuch as the community has been terminated by the judgment of
separation... .""6 The court went on to say that if public policy were
an issue, it would be in favor of protecting the wife's interest in the
community. The court was further confronted with the applicability
of Revised Statutes 9:5001, as it relates to the privilege on the pro-
ceeds of the judgment which the attorney claimed. It held that
recordation of the contract in this instance was not required. Fur-
ther, the court found that, in fact, the contract had been filed in the
suit and was recorded in the mortgage records.
The court in American General Investment Corp. v. St. Elmo
Lands held that a provision for attorneys' fees in a mortgage note
does not create any right or cause of action in favor of the payee's
attorney to intervene in or interfere with the client's litigation."
American General hired a law firm to institute two suits on pro-
missory notes secured by mortgages. One suit was by executory
process, the other proceeded via ordinaria. After service of the writ
of seizure in the executory proceeding, the plaintiff and defendant
began serious efforts to settle and compromise their differences.
The attorneys were instructed to suspend further litigation. The law
firm executed and recorded an affidavit asserting a privilege on the
property. Thereafter, American General terminated the law firm's
services and instructed it to withdraw as its counsel of record. The
parties later settled their differences through a sale of the property.
The sum of $300,000 was placed in escrow pending determination of
the amount of attorney's fees that might be due. The parties to the
litigation filed a motion to dismiss, with prejudice, the pending
foreclosures. The law firm sought to intervene as a party plaintiff in
the pending foreclosures and sought a contradictory hearing on the
issue of fees. The trial court dismissed the law suits and ordered the
mortgages cancelled, but retained jurisdiction to determine the
issues as to attorney's fees. The court of appeal reversed. After
reviewing the jurisprudence and the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, the court concluded that the law firm had no legal right to
join as a party plaintiff in its client's action and could do nothing to
interfere with or nullify the settlement which its former client had
made.
26. 384 So. 2d at 331.
27. 391 So. 2d 570 (La. App, 4th Cir. 1980).
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In Joiner v. Downing28 the court of appeal was called upon to ap-
ply the provisions of article 2315.1 of the Civil Code which provides
that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the defendant as
an item of taxable cost if the court determines that plaintiff's action
for defamation was frivolous. The court found that the suit was in
fact frivolous.' The defendant lawyer had written two letters of de-
mand on behalf of his client. The court found that these letters were
written on behalf of the clients, were relevant, and were made with
probable cause and without malice. The trial court had dismissed
the plaintiffs suit on a motion for directed verdict. The court fixed
fees at a rate it deemed reasonable and observed that courts are not
bound by agreements between attorneys and their clients as to the
amount of fees to be taxed as costs.
In Lennon v. Burdon, the plaintiff, a Mississippi lawyer, entered
into a contingency fee contract with defendant whereby plaintiff
would receive a one-third interest in any sums collected for claims
against the administrator of the estate of defendant's father arising
out of improper expenses and misappropriation of assets and funds
of the succession. Subsequently, defendant personally negotiated a
settlement with the attorney for the administrator for $10,000 cash
and title to a yacht. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the
plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, the fourth circuit held that there
was no indication that the cash and property received by defendant
in connection with the settlement was anything other than defen-
dant's rightful interest in the succession itself, nor was there any
evidence showing that such money and property were connected
with claims against the administrator.0 Therefore the attorney was
entitled to no fees.
In Deutsch, Kerrigan and Stiles v. Rault,3" a law partnership
sued for attorney's fees for services rendered to appellant in connec-
tion with earlier representation. Appellant and several other defend-
ants had been sued for more than $5,000,000 in damages for alleged
civil rights violations. At issue in the present suit was whether and
to what extent appellant was liable for the attorney's fees incurred
in the successful defense of the civil rights action. Appellees adduced
evidence that appellant had agreed to pay 25 percent of the total at-
torney's fees. Appellant denied liability for any expenses. The court
found that appellant never protested any of the six fee statements
that were submitted to him over a five-year period and that he was
28. 383 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 97.
30. Lennon v. Burdon, 394 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
31. 389 So. 2d 1373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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constantly informed of the status of the litigation as it progressed.
Citing Civil Code article 1811, the court held that "consent to an
agreement can be shown by action, inaction, or silence. There is am-
ple evidentiary proof to conclude by a preponderance the existence
of an implied contract."32 The appellate court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court awarding attorney's fees to the appellees.
An attorney sued to collect on a $20,000 promissory note given
in connection with a contract for legal services.3 The trial court re-
jected the attorney's contention that the only issue was whether or
not he was a holder in due course and held that the promissory note
was given in contemplation of legal services and that an attorney
can only recover for legal fees actually earned. The attorney's
representation continued for a period of approximately three months
before his dismissal. The client had paid $5,500 prior to signing
the promissory note. The trial court held that this payment of $5,500
was adequate compensation and dismissed the suit. The third circuit
held that the Code of Profesional Responsibility overrides legislative
acts to the contrary and that the attorney could not rely on the com-
mercial laws to collect a fee that he had not entirely earned. The
court recognized that, at the time of discharge, an attorney is entitled
to compensation for services actually rendered on a quantum meruit
basis. However, because of the serious nature of the criminal charge
against the client, the time expended by the attorney, and the high
degree of skill reflected in the work product of this particular at-
torney, the court set the minimum amount of compensation for his
services at $10,000 and awarded the attorney an addititional $4,500.
Another contest over fees arose in Horton v. Butler.' In that
case an attorney entered into a contingent fee contract for recovery
of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the client
died and $16,835.78 was paid the insurer for the fire loss. The heirs
of the decedent filed suit to obtain the proceeds, and the attorney
intervened seeking 25 percent under the contract. Although the trial
court ruled in favor of the attorney, the court of appeal recognized
the jurisprudential requirement that an attorney, even under a con-
tingent fee arrangement, must earn his fee. The court noted that
the only services rendered by the attorney consisted of contacting
the insurance company and later accepting the check for the pro-
ceeds. A fee of over $4,000 for these minimal services was, the court
found, clearly excessive. The case was remanded to the trial court to
establish the value of the services rendered by the attorney.
32. Id. at 1374.
33. Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
34. 387 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
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In Becnel v. Montz" an attorney sued a client for $1,500 for legal
services rendered. The attorney had previously billed the client
several times beginning in June 1976 in the amount of $100, without
specification. In October of 1977, after several such $100 statements
were billed, apparently the statement was paid. In November 1978
the attorney billed the client for $1,500, which the client refused to
pay. The attorney contended that the $100 statement was for office
expenses and that the client had agreed to perform certain sewer in-
stallation work for the attorney in exchange for the professional ser-
vices rendered. The $1,500 bill was sent when the attorney learned
that the client did not intend to perform the sewerage services. The
client testified that there was no agreement to perform sewerage
work and that he believed that $100 was the total amount owed. The
court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of defen-
dant, finding that the passage of two year's time without the plain-
tiff billing the defendant other than for the $100 supported defen-
dant's position. Further, the $100 statement was not itemized as to
the costs, nor was other evidence introduced to corroborate such
costs. Finally, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to
show any contract between plaintiff and defendant with regard to
the sewerage services to be performed by defendant or what
amount defendant might owe in lieu of performing such services.
Another controversy over contingent fees arose in Ethridge v.
Merchants Trust and Savings Bank." The trial court awarded the at-
torney $32,344.86 for legal services rendered to defendant bank in
two matters involving executory proceedings on real estate. The
bank appealed, contending that the agreement between the bank
and the attorney was that the attorney's fee would be based on a
time or quantum meruit basis rather than on a percentage basis.
The attorney testified that his agreement with the bank was to handle
all collections on a percentage fee basis as called for in the notes,
with no distinction or exception being made for foreclosures. Bank
officials did not contradict plaintiff's testimony. Additionally, the
bank contended that the attorney should not recover the amount
claimed because it was in excess of a reasonable fee and was
therefore prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility and
public policy. The court of appeal noted that there are several con-
siderations concerning the reasonableness of a fee. In the instant
case, the court noted that the attorney's claim was for two of many
collections undertaken for the bank, for some of which plaintiff col-
35. 384 So. 2d 1015 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
36. 389 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
lected nothing and was paid accordingly. In the context of the
overall relationship between the attorney and the bank, the percent-
age fee on the particular claim was not excessive. The court of ap-
peal did, however, alter the amount of the judgment to correct an
arithmetic error in computing the percentage fee.
MALPRACTICE
In Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,37 the se-
cond circuit reversed a lower court decision which had upheld a
client's claim against his attorney for failure to timely institute the
client's tort action. In the original action, suit was filed two days
after the prescriptive period, and the alleged tortfeasor was dismissed
on an exception of prescription. In the malpractice action, the jury
found that the plaintiff client was not contributorily negligent, that
the tortfeasor was guilty of negligence, and that the attorneys were
guilty of negligence in failing to institute suit timely. On appeal, the
second circuit reversed, holding that the jury's finding that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent was manifestly erroneous.
However, the second circuit did allow plaintiff to recover the sum of
$5,000, the fee which was required by plaintiff's attorney in the
malpractice action in addition to the normal contingency fee. The se-
cond circuit cited the supreme court case of Ramp v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Co.38 in support of allowing compensation for
the additional costs (attorney's fees in the malpractice action) incur-
red by the plaintiff in order to have his day in court, of which the
negligence of the defendant attorneys deprived him.
The question of whether a malpractice action against an at-
torney sounds in tort or in contract, or both, was again raised in the
case of Ambrose v. Roberts. 9 The third circuit in Ambrose held that
such a claim may sound both in tort and in contract, citing the case
of Jackson v. Zito," in which writs were refused by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Judge Stoker" concurring, pointed out that while a
more recent fourth circuit decision had held otherwise," the writ
denial" by the supreme court in that case did not necessarily imply
approval of the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, but
only the result. This remains an uncertain area of the law.
In St. Pierre v. General Am. Transp. Corp., after successful trial
37. 393 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
38. 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972).
39. 393 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
40. 314 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
41. Coreceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
42. 350 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1977).
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and appeal in a tort action, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action
against his former attorney alleging, inter alia, that the attorney
failed to sue the necessary parties and failed to make a timely objec-
tion to special interrogatories propounded to the jury. In the
malpractice action,'" the plaintiff incorporated by reference in the
petition the court of appeal opinion affirming the judgment of the
trial court in the original action. The defendant attorney and his in-
surer in the malpractice action moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the pleadings, including the court of appeal opinion,
failed to state a cause of action. In the original court of appeal opin-
ion, the court held that the plaintiff was barred from recovery by
his own contributory negligence. Thus the allegations of negligence
complained of by plaintiff in the malpractice action were insufficient
to state a cause of action, since the court found that the plaintiff
would have been precluded from recovery regardless of the at-
torney's alleged negligence, because of his contributory negligence."
In the case of Alfonso v. McIntyre,"5 plaintiffs sued their original
lawyer and his malpractice insurer for the attorney's failure to timely
perfect an appeal from an adverse judgment in a petitory action.
The first circuit, reviewing the written reasons for judgment and
the transcript in the original petitory action, found that the trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were correct and that,
therefore, the plaintiffs would not have obtained reversal even had
the appeal been timely perfected. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of
the malpractice action was affirmed.
43. St. Pierre v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 360 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978).
44. St. Pierre v. Washofsky, 391 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
45. 387 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
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